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NOTES
HOW FAVORED, EXACTLY? AN ANALYSIS OF
THE MOST FAVORED NATION THEORY OF
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM CALVARY
CHAPEL TO TANDON
Luray Buckner*
INTRODUCTION
In the past year, a certain momentum has gathered behind the
Court’s rulings on free exercise issues with cases like Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia and Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo manifesting
a vibrant free exercise jurisprudence. The Court has come a long way
since Employment Division v. Smith broke ground with its
pronouncement that rational basis review was the default for free
exercise cases. Justice Kavanaugh’s intriguing addition to this
discussion is his promotion of Douglas Laycock’s most favored nation
theory of religious exemptions. While this theory first appeared in a
sole dissent, 1 many scholars argue that it was explicitly adopted by a
majority of the Court in Tandon v. Newsom. 2 In fact, some scholars
predicted a devastating change in First Amendment jurisprudence

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2023. Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science, Franciscan University of Steubenville, 2016.
1 Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2612 (2020) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting).
2 See, e.g., Josh Blackman, The “Essential” Free Exercise Clause, 44 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 637, 717 (2021); Jim Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder: The Most Important Free
Exercise Decision Since 1990, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 15, 2021, 10:13 AM), https://
www.scotusblog.com/2021/04/tandon-steals-fultons-thunder-the-most-important-freeexercise-decision-since-1990/ [https://perma.cc/MRF5-MZTF]; Richard W. Garnett &
Mitchell Koppinger, Tandon v. Newsom, South Bay Pentecostal, Diocese of Brooklyn, and
Calvary Chapel on Religious Liberty and the Pandemic, in SCOTUS 2021: MAJOR DECISIONS
AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE US SUPREME COURT 119, 127 (Morgan Marietta ed., 2022).
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when Tandon was first decided. 3 Instead, the majority Court opinion
did not reference Tandon in the next high-profile free exercise case,
Fulton, and lower courts have not shown any tendency to apply the test
in a way that expands religious freedom. At this point, one might ask
whether the most favored nation theory was really an innovation in the
law at all and whether it actually changed the Smith analysis. Is there
any merit to using the most favored nation framework in analyzing
requests for religious accommodations and would such a framework
tend to be more solicitous of religious rights?
In this Note, I argue that Justice Kavanaugh’s most favored nation
test for religious exemptions actually differs from the one employed by
the majority of the Court in Tandon. The majority’s formulation of the
test is vague and explicitly requires courts to engage in a fact-intensive
comparability analysis. Practically, lower courts applying Tandon to
religious exemption questions have exploited this comparability step
to rule against religious claimants generally, but more specifically to
deny them strict scrutiny. Because the Tandon test was formulated to
apply to all free exercise claims, the test is necessarily framed in more
general terms and also imposes on religious claimants an additional
burden before they can benefit from strict scrutiny analysis. Justice
Kavanaugh’s analysis, however, is less ambitious in scope, applying only
to a subset of free exercise claims, and is formulated to provide more
rigorous protection of First Amendment rights. As a result, it would
provide a more consistent tool for deciding religious freedom cases
and would be more solicitous of religious rights. In Part I, I lay out the
legal and academic background necessary to understanding the most
favored nation theory of exemptions that Justice Kavanaugh
championed and that the Court applied in the pandemic cases. Then,
in Part II, I turn to the majority’s approach to the most favored nation
theory in Tandon and contrast it with Justice Kavanaugh’s description
of the theory, illustrating the similarities as well as the differences in
how the two approaches emphasize the necessity of comparability
between the religious and secular activities in question. Finally, in Part
III, I will examine four lower court decisions that have applied the
Tandon majority’s test to illustrate the shortcomings in the test as
currently applied and to demonstrate how these cases would have led
to different, religious-friendly, results under Justice Kavanaugh’s test.
3 ELIZABETH REINER PLATT, KATHERINE FRANKE & LILIA HADJIIVANOVA, L., RTS. &
RELIGION PROJECT, COLUM. L. SCH., WE THE PEOPLE (OF FAITH): THE SUPREMACY OF
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF A PANDEMIC 4 (2021) (“The Court’s new
interpretation of the First Amendment amounts to a radical expansion of constitutional
protections for religious exercise, made all the more remarkable by the fact that it has been
accomplished on terms that severely limit efforts to protect public health during a deadly
pandemic.”).
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
ACADEMIC ROOTS OF THE MOST FAVORED NATION
THEORY OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
A. A Legal History of First Amendment Jurisprudence

Immediately before the ground-breaking Smith decision of the
1990s, First Amendment free exercise jurisprudence was largely
carried out under the strict scrutiny standard established in Sherbert v.
Verner in 1963. 4 Before Sherbert, going back to the days of the
Founding, scholars debated whether the judiciary viewed exemptions
as a legitimate answer to First Amendment claims. Philip Hamburger,
for example, concludes from the historical evidence that courts could
deny religious accommodation to people “not merely in the event of
violence or force, but, more generally, upon the occurrence of illegal
actions.” 5 Practically speaking, that means that religious accommodations were not available when free exercise conflicted with the current
state of law and that Sherbert’s strict scrutiny regime is an aberration
from the original interpretation of the First Amendment. On the
other hand, scholars like Stephanie Barclay explain the paucity of
religious accommodations in the nineteenth century by the lack of
broadly-worded statutes curtailing religious exercise that were passed
and then reviewed by judges. 6 Barclay looks to the judicial attitude
toward exemptions generally and finds evidence that judges in the
early days of the country used their equity power to create “exemptions
from generally applicable laws,” including religious ones.7 For Barclay,
this is evidence that religious accommodations from generally
applicable laws were a legitimate way to balance the First Amendment
protections against the need for universal laws. Although scholars may
not agree on exactly what status exemptions from neutral laws had in
the beginning of the country, 8 as a matter of historical fact, religious
4 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
5 Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 918–19 (1992). Even some pro-religious liberty
scholars like Gerard Bradley argue that the religious clauses prohibit legislation motivated
by animosity toward religion, but do not require exemptions from neutral laws. While the
legislature may give out exemptions, the court is not required to do so. Gerard V. Bradley,
Is the First Amendment Hostile to Religion? Protecting Religious Liberty: Judicial and Legislative
Responsibilities, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 258–60 (1992).
6 Stephanie H. Barclay, The Historical Origins of Judicial Religious Exemptions, 96 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 55, 70–71 (2020).
7 Id. at 103–04.
8 Michael W. McConnell admits that the historical evidence is “mixed” on the subject
of religious exemptions in the early days of the country, but ultimately concludes that
“[t]here is no substantial evidence that . . . exemptions were considered constitutionally
questionable, whether as a form of establishment or as an invasion of liberty of conscience.”
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minorities benefited from these types of exemptions in the eighteenth
century. For example, military conscription and the oath for office
were both general laws that applied to the public at large, but both
requirements were modified or waived to accommodate religious
dissenters who objected to them. 9 Scholars have debated whether or
not these accommodations were constitutionally required, but at the
very least they reveal a permissive attitude toward religious
accommodations.
Until the First Amendment was incorporated against the states,
the Supreme Court did not have a chance to rule upon free exercise
cases. Not until 1879 did the Supreme Court decide its first major free
exercise case when it allowed the federal government to outlaw
polygamy in Reynolds v. United States over the objections of the Mormon
church. 10 This first case may seem to support the position that
religious accommodations are an aberration in free exercise
jurisprudence and that religious claimants are not typically exempt
from general laws. In 1963, however, the Supreme Court established
a predictable formula for First Amendment cases, formalizing its free
exercise jurisprudence into what was known as the strict scrutiny
analysis. Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana
Employment Security Division provide the hallmarks of pre-Smith
religious freedom litigation. In Sherbert, the Court wrote that unless
the religious action posed a “substantial threat to public safety, peace
or order,” the governmental regulation would be subject to strict
scrutiny, also known as the substantial burden analysis. 11 If the
claimant could show that the regulation imposed a burden upon the
free exercise of his religion, the government was then required to
justify the burden by showing it had a compelling interest in applying
the regulation to the religious claimant. 12 In Thomas, the Court looked
for a sincere religious belief—one that “need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others”—in finding a
substantial burden. 13 Judges were to accept the belief as sincere even
if the religious claimant had difficulty articulating his belief, his belief
conflicted with the majority of others in his religion, or he himself

Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1511 (1990).
9 THOMAS C. BERG, SUMMARY: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A POLARIZED AGE
(forthcoming), https://wwws.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/events/colloquium
/public-law/documents/berg-religious-liberty-in-a-polarized-age.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/2A4Y-SYDG] (page 2 of the chapter 7 summary).
10 Barclay, supra note 6, at 65; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879).
11 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
12 Id. at 403, 406.
13 Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
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struggled to accept the belief. 14 Even a law that is facially neutral
becomes unconstitutional as applied “if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion.”15 Once the religious litigant has cleared this low
hurdle of showing a burden, the government not only must justify the
regulation, but also prove that there are no alternative ways to achieve
its goal without “infringing [on] First Amendment rights.” 16 Such a
regime was generally favorable toward religious exemptions and, like
in the early days of the country, indicated a permissive attitude toward
religious accommodations. 17
A dramatic change came with Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 18 In 1990, Justice Scalia wrote for
the majority of the Court in Smith, upsetting the existing First
Amendment framework and ushering in a new legal framework for
analyzing free exercise claims. According to the Court, the First
Amendment does not require governments to give religious accommodations and rejected the position that “an individual’s religious beliefs
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate.” 19 The government no
longer needed a compelling reason to burden an individual’s free
exercise but needed only to pass the much lower standard of review
commonly referred to as rational basis review. The Court left only a few
paths open to litigants to reach the friendlier regime of strict scrutiny
review. 20 First, if the law was demonstrably not neutral or generally
applicable, then the Sherbert-era, strict scrutiny test would apply.21
Second and third, if there was a system of individualized exemptions 22
or the case involved hybrid-rights (a free exercise right coupled with
parental rights or free speech rights, for example), strict scrutiny was
available. 23 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah is a good
example of the first pathway to strict scrutiny. 24 In that case the
government showed overt hostility to religion and the Court examined

14 Id. at 715–16.
15 Id. at 717 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)).
16 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
17 Certainly, this approach also had its critics. One scholar argued that exemptions
in the Sherbert regime were “sponsorship and endorsement” of a religion and conflicted
with the Establishment Clause because it had “the impermissible effect of advancing
religion.” William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 308, 320 (1991).
18 Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
19 Id. at 878–79.
20 Id. at 884–86.
21 Id. at 871–72.
22 Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 48.
23 Smith, 494 U.S. at 872–73, 881.
24 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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the regulations more skeptically under strict scrutiny. 25 Regarding the
second category, the implicit problem with a system of individualized
exemptions is that the government is given discretion to make case-bycase decisions on who and what to accommodate. By its very terms,
such a law is not neutral and generally applicable. 26 Finally, the hybrid
rights exception enables the Court to justify decisions like Wisconsin v.
Yoder which otherwise would directly contradict the new rule that asapplied challenges to neutral and generally applicable laws are upheld
under rational basis review. 27
The public reception of Smith was not warm. Calls for its overrule
began almost immediately and continue to this day, most recently in
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. 28 In response to this revolution in free
exercise rights, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Reformation
Act (RFRA). According to the Act, the government could “not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion,” even by a facially
neutral law, unless it furthered a compelling governmental interest
and was the least restrictive means of doing so. 29 When the Court ruled
that RFRA did not apply to state governments, many states passed their
own versions of RFRA, some with more and some with less protection
than the federal version. 30 This was the state of First Amendment law
before the Supreme Court started hearing pandemic-related cases.

25 Id. at 541, 546. In that case, the Court ruled against the government’s regulations
prohibiting animal sacrifice because the laws arose from hostility to the Santeria religion.
The Court gave a list of indicators that the law was not neutral or generally applicable
including the fact that the law was gerrymandered to apply only to religious conduct, it was
enacted with hostility toward religion, it included categorical exemptions for secular
conduct, or it was selectively enforced against religious conduct. Id. at 535, 541, 537, 545.
26 The Smith Court mentioned Sherbert v. Werner as an example of individualized
exemptions. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
27 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). There, the Court gave Amish children an
exemption from the requirement to attend public school until age sixteen. Justice Scalia
characterizes this as a case involving both religious rights and parental rights. See id. at 213–
15.
28 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). Although the Court declined to explicitly overrule Smith in
that case, Justices Alito, Thomas and Gorsuch indicated their willingness to do so, and
Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett called on legal scholars for alternatives that could replace
Smith in the event of an overrule.
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2018).
30 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (finding that Congress’ attempt
to apply such a solicitous constitutional standard upon the states violated the separation of
powers and principles of federalism). Since 1993, twenty-three states had passed their own
versions of the federal RFRA. Matthew J. Branaugh, Religious Freedom Protection Expanded in
South Dakota and Montana, CHRISTIANITY TODAY: CHURCH L. & TAX (Aug. 5, 2021), https://
www.churchlawandtax.com/web/2021/may-2021/religious-freedom-protectionexpanded.html [https://perma.cc/F38T-92VF].
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B. The Birth of the Most Favored Nation Theory Of Religious Exemptions
Scholars living in the wasteland of Smith’s rational basis review
searched for the silver lining to the decision. This was how the most
favored nation theory of religious exemptions was born.
In
international law, a “most-favored-nation” clause is a treaty provision
that binds one state to treat the contracting state, “its nationals or
goods, no less favorably than any other state, its nationals or goods.”31
Most frequently used in trade, a most favored nation clause ensures
that the contracting nation receives the same import taxes, duties, etc.
as the state that is treated best under the opposing nation’s laws. 32 In
a law review article published the very year Smith was decided, Douglas
Laycock drew upon this tradition in order to explain the state of
religious freedom after Smith. He narrowed in on the individualized
exemption exception to rational basis review, writing:
In such individualized decisionmaking processes, the Court’s
explanation of its unemployment compensation cases would seem
to require that religion get something analogous to most-favored
nation status. Religious speech should be treated as well as political
speech, religious land uses should be treated as well as any other
land use of comparable intensity, and so forth.
Alleged
distinctions—explanations that a proposed religious use will cause
more problems than some other use already approved—should be
subject to strict scrutiny. 33

For Laycock, then, the most favored nation theory was merely an
analogical way to explain what was already the law in Smith. Such an
analysis does not seem to be earth-shattering, or even particularly
noteworthy.
However, in a second article, Laycock and co-author Steven Collis
added a twist to the theory. In imagining the best possible interpretation of the words “generally applicable,” the two suggested that
The question is not whether one or a few secular analogs are
regulated. The question is whether a single secular analog is not
regulated. The constitutional right to free exercise of religion is a
right to be treated like the most favored analogous secular conduct.
It is not enough to treat a constitutional right like the least favored,
most heavily regulated secular conduct. 34

This article is where the most favored nation theory gets its real teeth.
Laycock and Collis argue that even if the secular exemption is
necessary and obviously required as a matter of practicality (such as an
31 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 801 (AM. L. INST. 1987).
32 Id. at § 801 cmt. a.
33 Laycock, supra note 22, at 49–50.
34 Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2016).
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exemption to the no-beard requirement for those with a medical
condition that prevents them from shaving), the government has
permitted an exception and is now required to grant a religious
exemption too. 35 Notice what is not important to Laycock and Collis.
The religious exemption could undermine the government’s reason
for having the rule in the first place. It could be burdensome or costly
to administer. Such considerations are irrelevant. What matters is that
the government has signaled that some reasons are important enough
to merit an exception and, by excluding religious reasons, the
government is implicitly making a value judgment that religious
reasons are not as important as secular ones. For Laycock and Collis,
this is what is prohibited by the First Amendment, and this is what
prevents the law from being generally applicable.
C. The Pandemic Cases and Justice Kavanaugh’s Contribution
Laycock’s most favored nation theory made the leap from
academia to the world of the judiciary in a case arising from pandemicrelated regulations. In Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, Justice
Kavanaugh dissented from the denial of application for injunctive
relief and invoked the most favored nation theory to explain his legal
reasoning. 36 In that case, the Nevada government had limited houses
of worship to fifty occupants per building but allowed casinos and
other facilities to operate at 50% capacity. 37 The case came to the
Supreme Court when the rural church of Calvary Chapel requested an
injunction staying the state’s orders. 38 Although the Supreme Court
denied the injunction, Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent proved to be
prescient of the Court’s later approach to such questions. Justice
Kavanaugh divided laws that affect religion into four categories with a
corresponding form of legal review for each. 39 First are laws that
expressly discriminate against religious organizations because they are
religious. These laws are generally unconstitutional. 40 Next are laws
that expressly favor religious organizations, giving them benefits that
are not afforded to comparable secular institutions. 41 Justice
Kavanaugh cautions that these laws can sometimes run afoul of the
Establishment Clause because of “the apparent favoritism of
religion.” 42 Third, some laws treat religious and secular organizations
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 14–15, 21–23.
140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2604.
Id.
Id. at 2610.
Id. at 2610–11.
Id. at 2611.
Id.
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the same and are facially neutral but may burden religious claimants. 43
In the face of such burden, the religious claimant may seek an
exemption from the law as applied to them, or attack it on the grounds
that the legislature was motivated by hostility toward religion. 44 Finally,
the fourth category is comprised of laws that “supply no criteria for
government benefits or action, but rather divvy up organizations into
a favored or exempt category and a disfavored or non-exempt
category.” 45 Unlike laws in the first or second categories, these laws
are not formulated around the religious character of the institution.
However, unlike the third category of laws, they do not treat all
organizations the same. 46
Justice Kavanaugh found that the challenged laws in Nevada fell
into this fourth category. He then cited Laycock’s article to support
the proposition that the State must place religious organizations in the
favored category or provide sufficient justification why it does not. 47
For Justice Kavanaugh, the test requires a two-step analysis. First, the
judge asks whether the law creates a class of favored or exempt
organizations and whether religion falls into that class. 48 Second, if the
religious organizations are not favored, the government has to provide
“sufficient justification” for the unfavorable treatment. 49 While most
of the pandemic cases were concerned with comparing churches and
religious activities to other secular activities that were either more or
less restricted, Justice Kavanaugh promoted his test as eschewing such
balancing. 50 Many pandemic restrictions varied even across secular
establishments, so if the Court decided a church was more like a
concert venue than a grocery store, a different regulation could apply.
However, according to Justice Kavanaugh, such a minute analysis is not
necessary under his framework because the religious litigants need
only show that one secular activity was more favorably treated. Justice
Kavanaugh cites Laycock and Collis’s single secular analog rule to

43 Id. Justice Kavanaugh gives the example of a fire code that requires sprinklers in
certain buildings regardless of whether a church or a car dealership owns the building as
an example of this third category.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 2611–12.
46 The rough beginnings of this schema can be found in Justice Kavanaugh’s
concurrence in Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Freedom from Religion Foundation
where he contrasts religious accommodation cases as separate and distinct from cases in
which the state discriminates on the basis of religion. Morris Cnty. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders v. Freedom from Religion Found., 139 S. Ct. 909, 910–11 (2019) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring).
47 Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2612 (citing Laycock, supra note 22, at 49–50).
48 Id. at 2613.
49 Id.
50 Id.
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support this point, claiming it is “absolutely critical” to determining
whether a religious exemption is constitutionally required. 51 Applying
his test to the case at hand, Justice Kavanaugh found that Nevada could
not justify placing churches in the disfavored, nonexempt category. 52
Shortly after Calvary Chapel, the Court had a chance to address
similar questions in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo. 53 In
this case, Jewish and Catholic communities sought an injunction for
the governor’s order that limited houses of worship to ten or twentyfive people at a time while allowing essential businesses to operate at
full capacity. Justice Kavanaugh once again laid out his most favored
nation theory, this time in a concurrence. He argued that New York
had created a favored class of businesses and was therefore required to
justify why houses of worship were not in that favored category. 54 He
wrote that, “under this Court’s precedents, it does not suffice for a
State to point out that, as compared to houses of worship, some secular
businesses are subject to similarly severe or even more severe
restrictions.”55 Once again, the regulations would fail because they
were not sufficiently justified. 56 Justice Kavanaugh’s brief opinion laid
out substantially the same analysis found in his Calvary Chapel dissent.
Finally, the climactic moment came with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Tandon v. Newsom to grant injunctive relief to the religious
litigants mere days after it was requested. 57 Here, the per curiam
opinion cited Justice Kavanaugh’s Roman Catholic Diocese concurrence
in holding that California’s ban on in-home gatherings of more than
three households for religious services likely violated the First
Amendment. 58 The Court wrote that:
[G]overnment regulations are not neutral and generally
applicable, and therefore trigger strict scrutiny under the Free
Exercise Clause, whenever they treat any comparable secular
activity more favorably than religious exercise. It is no answer that
a State treats some comparable secular businesses or other activities
as poorly as or even less favorably than the religious exercise at
issue. 59

Providing some much-needed clarity, the Court explained that
whether a secular activity was comparable to a religious one should be
51 Id. (citing Laycock & Collis, supra note 34, at 22).
52 Id.
53 Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring).
54 Id. at 73.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021).
58 Id. at 1296.
59 Id. (citing Roman Catholic Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 67–68).
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determined by judging it against “the asserted government interest
that justifies the regulation at issue.” 60 Like Justice Kavanaugh, the
majority placed the burden on the government to make this justification and to show that it was impossible to make the regulation less
burdensome. 61 Although at first glance Justice Kavanaugh’s most
favored nation theory of religious exemptions appeared to have won
over the hearts of a majority on the Court, the story is not quite so
straightforward.
II.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN SMITH, TANDON’S MOST
FAVORED NATION THEORY, AND JUSTICE
KAVANAUGH’S CALVARY CHAPEL TEST

Although ultimately the Tandon analysis and the Calvary Chapel
approach are distinguishable, both are significant departures from the
Smith framework. While Smith did discuss a system of individualized
exemptions, it did so narrowly and as a way to keep Sherbert as good
precedent, not as a generalized framework for all exemptions. 62 In
Sherbert, the government gave out unemployment benefits to those
who with “good cause” were not able to accept employment offered to
them, but did not consider the refusal to work on the Sabbath for
religious reasons a good cause. 63 The Court held that the government
must include religious reasons as good cause reasons and give eligible
workers unemployment benefits. 64 In Smith, the unemployment
benefits were denied for a similar reason, because the state decided
that ingesting peyote during a religious ceremony (the reason why the
religious claimants were fired) made them ineligible for employment
benefits. In explaining why Sherbert’s compelling interest test should
not apply to the case at hand, the Supreme Court explained that
Sherbert was “a context that lent itself to individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.” 65 In that circumstance, “where the State has in place a system of individual
exemptions,” it cannot refuse an exemption for religious conduct
“without compelling reason[s].” 66 In terms of Sherbert, the Court
seemed to think that the governmental discretion involved in making
a case-by-case determination of whether an organization shall receive
benefits undermines the neutrality or generality of the law.

60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id. at 1296–97.
Blackman, supra note 2, at 718.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).
Id. at 408–09.
Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
Id.
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Tandon endorsed an expansion of the system of individualized
exemptions referenced in Smith by requiring religious accommodation
when there is a single secular exemption. 67 Such a change is not
insignificant. The Smith language—“a system of individualized
exemptions”—implies that the government has broad discretion to
administer a program individually. It does not necessarily include
administrative or physically necessary exceptions. The rationale in
Smith was that the law could not be generally applicable if the
government had the discretion to make case-by-case decisions about
whether an individual person would receive the benefit or exemption.
That same rationale does not justify the Tandon and Calvary Chapel
rules that only require one, comparable, secular exemption. Under
Smith, a law could theoretically be neutral and generally applicable if
some organizations were treated more favorably than others as long as
the determination depended on a rational, statutory basis rather than
an exercise of administrative discretion. With the Tandon and Calvary
Chapel development, “the Court has reinterpreted Smith in a way that
would be unrecognizable to Justice Scalia. It has so profoundly
changed the meaning of ‘discrimination’ against religion that Smith’s
central holding—that religious objectors must obey nondiscriminatory
laws—has been largely hollowed out.” 68 In fact, in a dissenting opinion
to a denial of injunctive relief, Justice Gorsuch described the system of
individualized exemptions and the disfavored treatment of
comparable activities as two distinguishable, though related, paths
toward strict scrutiny. 69
Tandon and Calvary Chapel share the same broad holding that a
“law or policy that contains exemptions and exceptions—or even a
mechanism for granting accommodations on a case-by-case basis—is
not . . . generally applicable, and so must be carefully evaluated if it
imposes a burden on religious exercise.”70 However, there are
differences between the two tests that, as discussed below, lead to
astonishingly different outcomes.
The main difference comes in how the tests handle comparability.
For Justice Kavanaugh, the most favored nations analysis did not
67 Jim Oleske, Fulton Quiets Tandon’s Thunder: A Free Exercise Puzzle, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 18, 2021, 4:20 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/fulton-quiets-tandonsthunder-a-free-exercise-puzzle/ [https://perma.cc/JXL3-WVTU].
68 PLATT, FRANKE & HADJIIVANOVA , supra note 3, at 10.
69 Doe v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17, 19–20 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). After citing
Lukumi to support the claim that individualized exemptions require strict scrutiny, Justice
Gorsuch cites Tandon and its comparable activity language as “another related reason” why
strict scrutiny applies. Id.
70 Richard W. Garnett, After Fulton, Religious Foster Care Agencies Still Vulnerable, FIRST
THINGS (June 22, 2021), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2021/06/afterfulton-religious-foster-care-agencies-still-vulnerable [https://perma.cc/4TSW-3ZBT].
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require “judges to decide whether a church is more akin to a factory
or more like a museum.”71 The only time he deals with the necessity
of comparison is when deciding in which category the law belongs. For
Justice Kavanaugh, the most favored nation test is an answer to the
question of what constitutional requirements apply when, in zoning,
for example, “religious properties arguably could be considered
similar to some of the secular properties in both [favored and
disfavored] categories.” 72 Justice Kavanaugh does not elaborate on
this section in terms of how good the arguments have to be or how
comparable the religious and secular activities or organizations must
be. Of course, he does quote Laycock’s “single secular analog”
language when discussing step two of his test, 73 but overall Justice
Kavanaugh determines that judges do not have to compare
organizations at all in the initial step since the “only question” is
whether religious organizations are in the favored category. 74 The
implication is that as long as the parties can rationally argue the
religious activity or organization resembles the secular ones that are
favored, the most favored nation analysis applies. Practically, the judge
might engage in an implicit comparison in step two of Justice
Kavanaugh’s test, which examines the government’s justification of
disfavored treatment. When examining Nevada’s rules for business
capacity, Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that “the State cannot plausibly
maintain that those large secular businesses are categorically safer than
religious services.”75 However, because the inquiry is ultimately about
the government’s justification, Justice Kavanaugh examines the
rationale for the distinction rather than the similarities between the
activities or characteristics of churches and grocery stores.
The Tandon majority also has to grapple with comparability, but
in that case the Court lists it as a distinct step in the analysis. While the
Court still maintains that the strict scrutiny analysis applies whenever a
single secular activity is treated more favorably than a religious one,
the two activities must be comparable. 76 The very first step in the
analysis for the Tandon Court is whether the government is treating a
comparable secular activity more favorably than a religious one. 77 And
in the second step, the Court explicitly engages in a comparison of the
secular and religious activities. Here, the activities are “judged against
71 Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2613 (2020) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 2612.
73 Id. at 2613 (quoting Laycock & Collis, supra note 34, at 22).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2615.
76 Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021).
77 Id.
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the asserted government interest that justifies the regulation at
issue.” 78 Only after the Court concludes that the religious activity is
similar enough to the secular one does it pass into the third and final
step which places the burden on the government to satisfy strict
scrutiny. 79
Does this difference matter? The answer is a resounding yes.
While theoretically a judge could apply the two tests to achieve the
same result, in practice the Tandon test is much easier to manipulate
to rule against religious litigants. As the following cases demonstrate,
Tandon has not opened the floodgates to religious liberty
accommodations but rather slowed the trickling stream of
accommodations down to a drip. The reason is that for Justice
Kavanaugh the mere fact that the government has started to divide
organizations up into different categories is a reason to shift the
burden onto the government and use the strict scrutiny analysis. On
the other hand, in Tandon, the judge is given leeway to decide, as a
preliminary step of the analysis, whether the secular activity is
comparable to the religious one. In this analysis of similarity, the test
loses predictability because judges can highlight or minimize the
differences in order to justify whether the religious claimant will
benefit from strict scrutiny review or will be analyzed on a rational basis
review. To be fair, the Court itself probably did not intend to create a
different test in Tandon. When Justice Gorsuch explained the Tandon
test in his concurring opinion in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, he
emphasized that the mere existence of an exemption means the law is
not generally applicable and must be examined strictly. The state’s
“power to grant exemptions . . . anywhere ‘undercuts its asserted
interests’ and thus ‘trigger[s] strict scrutiny’ for applying the policy
everywhere.” 80 Justice Gorsuch at least considers the discretionary
power as the central point of the test, not the comparability of the
actions. However, lower courts have used the comparability step to
consistently rule against religious claimants and Tandon has a poor
record of protecting free exercise.
A second element of potential divergence between the two tests is
the standard of review that applies at the end of the analysis. The
majority explicitly applies strict scrutiny in Tandon, writing that the
government “has the burden to establish that the challenged law
satisfies strict scrutiny.” 81 As expected, this requires the government to
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1296–97.
80 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1929 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
21, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123)).
81 Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1296.
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justify why religious exercise must be treated differently to achieve the
governmental interest and that the method used is narrowly tailored
to achieve that end. 82 In contrast, Justice Kavanaugh only requires a
“sufficient justification” for the governmental intrusion. What exactly
does Justice Kavanaugh mean by “sufficient justification”? In
threshing out the standard, Justice Kavanaugh quotes Smith, requiring
the government to have a “compelling reason” and Fraternal Order of
Police v. Newark, which requires a “substantial justification” for the
government’s decision. 83
This seems to indicate that Justice
Kavanaugh intends to invoke either strict scrutiny or something very
much like it for the analysis. Justice Kavanaugh’s application of his test
to Nevada’s regulations provide further evidence that he intends to use
strict scrutiny as the standard of review. Justice Kavanaugh found that
the government had a “compelling interest” at stake, but it did not
overcome its burden of showing that the occupancy limits placed on
churches was narrowly tailored to achieve that end. 84 The analysis
looks very much like strict scrutiny since the burden is on the
government to justify its regulation and prove that it is narrowly
tailored. Based on this evidence, it is reasonable to assume that Justice
Kavanaugh intended to invoke strict scrutiny review when he wrote
about “sufficient justification.”
Finally, it is worth noting that the Tandon majority almost exclusively speaks in terms of religious exercise while Justice Kavanaugh’s
test applies to discrimination against religious organizations in their
status as organizations. For Tandon, what matters is whether the “two
activities” are comparable and if the government can justify its
regulation of “First Amendment activity.” 85 Justice Kavanaugh,
however, considers whether “religious organizations” are favored and
whether there is sufficient reason for treating them differently. 86
Perhaps the reason for this difference is that the majority tried to
formulate a rule that would apply generally to all situations where free
exercise claims are raised—perhaps intending to merely reformulate,
rather than alter Smith—while Justice Kavanaugh applies the most
favored nation theory to a discrete category of laws: ones that divide
organizations into favored and disfavored categories. Because Justice
Kavanaugh has narrowed the universe of cases that his test applies to,
he is able to formulate it so that it is more solicitous of religious
82 Id. at 1296–97.
83 Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2612 (2020) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting) (first quoting Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990); and then quoting
Fraternal Ord. of Police Newark Lodge No. 12, 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)).
84 Id. at 2613.
85 Tandon, 141 S. Ct. at 1296–97.
86 Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2613.
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exercise while the Tandon test cannot provide as much guidance to
judges in how to balance and apply the test. This may be another
reason why the Tandon test in practice has proven to be less solicitous
of religious claimants while Justice Kavanaugh’s test would likely
provide more protection to religious litigants seeking
accommodations.
III.

TANDON IN THE LOWER COURTS PROVIDES LITTLE RELIEF FOR
RELIGIOUS LITIGATORS WHILE CALVARY CHAPEL
WOULD CONSISTENTLY HAVE DONE SO

The lower courts that have applied Tandon to free exercise cases
have used it to deny accommodations to religious litigants. A case out
of Michigan recently used the Tandon analysis when considering a
religious challenge to the Michigan governor’s executive order
mandating masks in schools. 87 The order required all children in
grades K–5 to wear masks while in school. 88 The district court denied
the plaintiff’s request for an injunction staying the order and on
appeal the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision. 89 The
appellate court quite clearly applied the Tandon analysis in determining whether the religious claimants were entitled to relief and whether
to examine the regulation under strict scrutiny or under rational basis
review. After examining conflicting precedents, the court decided that
“[s]chools educating students in grades K–5 are unique in bringing
together students not yet old enough to be vaccinated against COVID19 in an indoor setting and every day. Accordingly, the proper
comparable secular activity in this case remains public and private
nonreligious schools.”90 Because masks were required in private
nonreligious and public schools, the court determined that the law was
generally applicable and rational basis review applies to the question.
Under the Tandon test, this outcome is hardly debatable. However,
Justice Kavanaugh’s test from Calvary Chapel characterizes the question
quite differently and arguably leads to a different result.
First, the executive order divides up certain organizations into
favored and disfavored categories, which would make it part of Justice
Kavanaugh’s fourth category of laws. Grocery stores must require their
customers to wear masks, but restaurants and food service establishments do not need to require masks of their patrons. 91 Businesses must
87 Resurrection Sch. v. Hertel, 11 F.4th 437, 441 (6th Cir. 2021), vacated pending
rehearing en banc, 16 F.4th 1215, 1216 (6th Cir. 2021) (mandate stayed pending hearing).
88 Id. at 447.
89 Id. at 441.
90 Id. at 457–58.
91 Id. at 444–45.
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require employees to wear masks, but an auditorium hosting a speaker
addressing an audience twelve feet away does not have to require the
speaker to wear a mask. 92 Private, religious schools must require all
students to wear masks, but churches do not have to require children
engaging in a religious service to wear a mask. 93 The plaintiff’s free
exercise claim is that wearing a mask at the school prevents their
children from effectively learning the Catholic faith through their
Catholic school education. 94 In Justice Kavanaugh’s analysis, the
private school teaching children the faith could arguably fall into the
favored category of organizations (because it is arguably akin to
churches and restaurants) as well as the disfavored category (because
it is also like the public schools). With this background, the court
should embark on the first prong of the test: asking whether the activity
is in the favored category. Here, it is not. According to the second
prong, the Court now must engage with the government’s justification
for why religious schools should fall into the disfavored category rather
than the favored one. At this stage, the religious claimants may still
lose depending on whether the judge accepts the state’s arguments
that prolonged interaction in schools is significantly different from
gathering together to worship for a couple of hours or sitting down for
a meal. However, the analysis must be conducted under strict scrutiny
which means the government will have to justify applying the
regulation to the private school as well as show that it is narrowly
tailored. This would give the religious litigants a better chance at an
accommodation.
A few comments on the difference between the Tandon test and
Justice Kavanaugh’s test are in order. First, the Michigan executive
order is phrased in terms of favored/exempt and disfavored/nonexempt activities rather than favored or disfavored organizations. As
mentioned above, this is one difference between the two tests that
makes Tandon more clearly applicable since it encompasses all free
exercise claims rather than claims centered around organizations and
their treatment. The law could still fairly fall into Justice Kavanaugh’s
fourth category of rules, however, since the organizations are the
entities required to enforce the mask requirements upon individuals
engaged in the specified activities. Second, Tandon’s step one
comparability analysis proved to be insurmountable for the religious
claimants, but they did not face that obstacle in Justice Kavanaugh’s
regime. Once the judge decided that private schools and public
schools are comparable because they pose similar risks to the spread

92
93
94

Id.
Id.
Id. at 447.
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of COVID-19—as indeed they must under Tandon—the law was
deemed neutral and generally applicable and the religious claim was
analyzed under rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny. By the
mere fact of the division of organizations, however, Justice
Kavanaugh’s test puts the burden on the government to justify its
reason for treating a religious school as disfavored rather than as
favored like religious churches or restaurants.
A second case that arose because of pandemic-related regulation
was Does v. Mills, which was decided in a Maine district court. In that
case, the religious claimants sought an exemption from the regulation
requiring all healthcare employees to receive the COVID-19
vaccination. 95 The Maine Legislature issued a rule that required
healthcare workers to receive certain vaccinations and originally
included both medical and religious exemptions. 96 In 2019, the
legislature amended the rule to remove religious exemptions from the
requirement and in 2021 added the COVID-19 shot to the requirements. 97 Once again, the court explicitly applied Tandon to the free
exercise claim and found that the regulation should be viewed under
a rational basis review, ruling against the religious claimants. 98 In
engaging in the comparability analysis, the court probably misapplied
even Tandon when finding that medical exemptions were not
comparable to religious exemptions. The court found that in this case
“there is a fundamental difference between a medical exemption—
which is integral to achieving the public health aims of the mandate—
and exemptions based on religious or philosophical objections—
which are unrelated to the mandate’s public health goals.”99 The
asserted government interest is what is comparable in this case; that is,
protecting public health by reducing the spread of COVID-19. Upon
review, the First Circuit court affirmed the decision, declaring that “the
comparability concerns the Supreme Court flagged in the Tandon line
of cases are not present here.”100 Once again, the court briskly
declared that strict scrutiny therefore did not apply and decided the
case upon rational basis review. 101

95 Does 1–6 v. Mills, No. 21-cv-00242, 2021 WL 4783626, at *1 (D. Me. Oct. 13, 2021).
96 Id. at *4.
97 Id.
98 Id. at *8, *12.
99 Id. at *8.
100 Does 1–6 v. Mills, 16 F.4th 20, 32 (1st Cir. 2021). The Supreme Court denied an
application for injunctive relief on October 29, 2021. Does 1–3 v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17 (2021).
Justice Kavanaugh joined Justice Barrett’s concurrence in denying such “extraordinary
relief” in a case which is “the first to address the questions presented” without full briefing
and argument. Id. at 18 (Barrett, J., concurring).
101 Does 1–6, 16 F.4th at 32.
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The district court erred in this case by comparing the reasons why
the regulation exempted people with medical conditions. What is
important are not the common-sense reasons or necessities why the
government may have granted certain exemptions, but the fact that
the government has decided some reasons justify an accommodation
and some do not. 102 As Justice Gorsuch stated when applying Tandon,
“[e]xceptions for one means strict scrutiny for all.” 103 The judgment
call of whether religious exercise counts as a good reason to grant an
exemption is not left to the discretion of the legislature; the
Constitution requires religious reasons to be treated as well as secular
reasons. A proper reading of Tandon would require the court to find
that religious and medical exemptions are comparable because both
undermine the state’s goals of protecting public health, especially the
most vulnerable, and keeping healthcare workers healthy. 104 The
court reasoned that public health would be undermined by giving
healthcare workers a vaccine that would harm them medically, but that
requiring a vaccination of those who have conscientious objections
would not. 105 While this particular interest may be more clearly
undermined by religious exemptions, the entire reason for the vaccine
mandate is to protect the state through universal vaccination. That
goal is undermined any time someone does not get the shot, whether
for religious or medical reasons. Although this case is probably
incorrectly decided, 106 it illustrates that lower courts have interpreted
Tandon so that it does not provide strong protection to religious
litigants, even in seemingly clear cases.
Under Justice Kavanaugh’s test, the court would have less
flexibility to craft a preferred outcome. The law creates a favored
group—those with medical reasons for refusing the COVID-19 shot—
and a disfavored group—those with philosophical or religious reasons
for refusing the shot. Because Justice Kavanaugh only requires an
“arguable” similarity between the religious activity and the secular one,
the court would be hard pressed to deny that refusing the shot for
religious reasons is similar to refusing it for medical reasons. After all,
the result is exactly the same. Now that the law is subject to the most
favored nation analysis, the religious claimants are in the disfavored
102 In Tandon, the court said that the reasons why people gather were not important,
what mattered was whether the gatherings threatened the government’s interest. Tandon
v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam).
103 Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1929 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
104 Does 1–6, 16 F.4th at 31.
105 Id.
106 See Justice Gorsuch’s dissent from the denial of injunctive relief as an example of
how the Supreme Court would apply Tandon and the strict scrutiny analysis to this case.
Does 1–3, 142 S. Ct. at 19 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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category and so would immediately receive the preferential standard
of strict scrutiny. While the government certainly would have a
compelling interest in promoting public health through vaccination,
it would have a difficult time showing that the regulation is narrowly
tailored to achieve that end. The district court distinguished this case
from Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark; 107 however, that case actually
speaks quite specifically to the underlying doctrinal question. In
Fraternal Order of Police, the government required every police officer
to be clean-shaven except those with medical conditions or undercover
assignments. 108 The state’s asserted interest was uniformity of
appearance which justified the rule against beards and its application
to Muslim officers who sought an exception for religious reasons. 109 In
both the Maine case and in Newark, the government’s objective is
undermined by any exemption and so once one is granted, even for a
necessary reason, the door is open for religious exceptions. Tandon’s
second step, at which judges determine whether the religious and
secular activities are comparable, once again led to the death of the
religious litigant’s claim. Under Tandon, the court was able to
summarily dismiss the claim because of the supposed dissimilarity,
while under Justice Kavanaugh’s test, the single secular analog element
would force the court to engage in strict scrutiny analysis, giving the
religious claimant a better chance of success.
Moving beyond the context of pandemic regulations, the Tandon
test applies to all free exercise claims, but Justice Kavanaugh’s test
would still be more solicitous of religious rights. A recent case in
Colorado about religious accommodations illustrates this point. In
303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, a creative designer sought an exemption
from Colorado’s laws that prohibited individuals from refusing service
to others on account of sexual orientation and from publishing any
communication expressing the message that patronage is unwelcome
because of an individuals’ sexual orientation. 110 However, a patron
may restrict access to certain goods and facilities to individuals of one
sex “if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods,
services, facilities, privileges[, etc.].” 111 The plaintiff hoped to expand
her services to include custom wedding websites, but her religious
beliefs prevented her from celebrating same-sex weddings. 112 While
she would serve anyone regardless of their sexual orientation, she
107 Does 1–6 v. Mills, No. 21-cv-00242, 2021 WL 4783626, at *11 (D. Me. Oct. 13, 2021).
108 Fraternal Ord. of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360
(3d Cir. 1999).
109 Id. at 366.
110 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 6 F.4th 1160, 1169–70 (10th Cir. 2021).
111 Id. at 1169 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(3) (2021)).
112 Id. at 1172.
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would not create a custom website that expressed support of same-sex
marriage. 113 The court in this case found that Colorado’s law against
discrimination was generally applicable and that rational basis review
was required. 114 Although Colorado did allow message-based refusals
of service, the court found that such a refusal was not comparable to
the plaintiff’s refusal to celebrate same-sex marriage. Instead, the
court decided that the appropriate comparator would be someone
who refused to support same-sex marriage for secular reasons. Here,
the religious claimant “provide[d] no evidence that Colorado permits
secularly-motivated objections to serving LGBT consumers.”115 The
court dealt with the “bona fide” exemption in the same way, saying
that it did not trigger strict scrutiny because the government had not
yet declared a religious reason for discrimination invalid while
simultaneously upholding a secular reason. 116
Once again, the court is probably not properly applying the
Tandon test, and once again this case reveals that the step two
comparability analysis is easy to abuse because of its vague standard.
As the dissent aptly points out, the mere fact that an exception exists
whereby discrimination is tolerated should trigger strict scrutiny of
religious reasons for discrimination. 117 This is a clear system of caseby-case, discretionary decisions on who must comply with the law.
However, the Tandon test is admittedly difficult to apply in this context.
The first step is whether a religious exercise is treated less favorably
than a secular one, so it is understandable why the court would look
for secularly-motivated discrimination against sexual orientation as a
comparator. The state condoned a message-based refusal by a baker
when he refused to make a cake with a Bible verse and a message that
expressed disapproval of same-sex marriage. 118 That exemption was
given for a secularly-motivated refusal of serve and would require the
state to give refusals of service for religious reasons similarly favorable
treatment. The difficulty here lies in the justification for the law since
the government intends to protect the dignity of homosexual
individuals. The state could argue that permitting the religious
objector to refuse service harms the dignity of the same-sex couple
while a refusal to make anti-gay marriage messages does not. This
comparability analysis will depend on how exactly the judge
characterizes the purpose of the law and the similarity between the
activities. When judges are given authority to define whether an
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 1192 (Tymkovich, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1188 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1186.
Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1208 (Tymkovich, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1185–86 (majority opinion).
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activity is comparable based on the justification for regulation (here,
that would be a desire to promote equal treatment of LGBT
consumers) the results are unpredictable and vary according to a
particular judge’s sensitivities.
On the other hand, Justice Kavanaugh’s test does not require
judges to engage in detailed comparison. Colorado claims that the law
“allows for message-based refusals” which means that some kinds of
service refusals—refusals because the creator disagrees with the
message—are exempt from the law while those done because of the
status of the customer are not exempt. 119 Because the religious-based
refusal is declaratively a refusal because of the message, and not
because of status, the government must explain why it has denied this
favored status under a strict scrutiny standard. In this analysis, the
court must determine whether the government’s goal of promoting
equal treatment for homosexual couples is narrowly tailored to achieve
its end. Although a balancing of interests is still required with Justice
Kavanaugh’s test, at least it is carried out under the banner of strict
scrutiny rather than rational basis.
Finally, Chung v. Washington Interscholastic Activities Organization
dealt with Tandon in the context of school scheduling requirements
and shows that Justice Kavanaugh’s test has the potential to apply
beyond religious organizations. In this case, Seventh-day Adventists
sought an accommodation for their Sabbath observance in the
scheduling of high school tennis tournaments. 120 The court decided
that strict scrutiny did not apply because it found that Tandon required
“myriad exceptions” to the rule before strict scrutiny applied. 121 The
plaintiffs pointed out that the school did accommodate religious
exercise when scheduling volleyball tournaments because religious
schools competed and the entire team needed an exemption. 122
Additionally, golf tournaments were not scheduled for the weekend
because golf courses were not open. 123 However, the court determined
that these reasons were so different from the reasons to grant an
individual religious exemption that they were not comparable. The
golf exception was because of practical necessity and the volleyball
accommodation was a categorical, rather than an individual
exemption. 124 The court here once again manipulated Tandon’s step
two comparability analysis to rule against the religious claimants. After
119 Id. at 1210 (Tymkovich, C.J., dissenting).
120 Chung v. Wash. Interscholastic Activities Ass’n, No. C19-5730, 2021 WL 3129624, at
*1 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2021).
121 Id. at *3.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.

2022]

HOW FAVORED, EXACTLY?

1665

all, nowhere in Tandon did the Supreme Court indicate that multiple
exceptions were a prerequisite for granting a religious
accommodation. However, the formulation of the Tandon test is
unfortunately vague and only weakly protects religious exercise.
In contrast, Justice Kavanaugh’s approach would almost certainly
lead to strict scrutiny. The mere fact that some sports receive religious
accommodations and that others do not indicates that there are
favored and disfavored categories, and tennis should be in the same
category as other sports like volleyball. Under Justice Kavanaugh’s test,
the fact that some exemption requests come from individuals and
some from teams would only factor into the second prong of the state’s
justification for treating the two activities differently. Quite likely, the
court would find that this was not a sufficient justification. After all, if
the reasons for denying exemptions are ease of scheduling and
convenience to the students, such reasons are probably not going to
carry the day in a strict scrutiny analysis. Once again, it is important to
note that Justice Kavanaugh’s test is formulated to protect religious
organizations from being treated worse than secular organizations. In
this case and others, the free exercise claim is phrased in terms of
individual accommodation or free exercise activities. The Calvary
Chapel framework is flexible enough to fit these fact patterns as well,
but it is worth considering whether Justice Kavanaugh intended his test
to encompass so much. The four types of law mentioned in Calvary
Chapel appear to be Justice Kavanaugh’s attempt to categorize all
religious claims. 125 Justice Kavanaugh explained all four categories of
laws in terms of their effect upon religious organizations rather than
upon individual religious litigants or religious activity generally. If
Justice Kavanaugh is truly making an exhaustive list, it is reasonable to
extrapolate that the fourth category must include not just treatment of
religious organizations but also treatment of individuals.
Consequently, Tandon’s initial advantage of providing a flexible
framework for analyzing all free exercise cases may be moot if Justice
Kavanaugh’s test extends beyond mere religious institutions into
religious activities generally and individual religious litigants. As cases
like Chung show, Justice Kavanaugh’s most favored nation test is
flexible enough to encompass a broad spectrum of religious liberty
claims.
A final question to address is whether Justice Kavanaugh’s test
would be subject to the same danger of manipulation that the Tandon
test has experienced in the lower courts. The weakness of Justice
Kavanaugh’s test is that he does not explicitly state the standard for
125 Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2610 (2020) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting).
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when a religious activity could “arguably” fall into either the favored
or disfavored category. As it stands now, lower courts may be tempted
to avoid Justice Kavanaugh’s analysis altogether by simply “explaining
away” why the religious activity is unlike the secular one. Perhaps the
best formulation of Justice Kavanaugh’s test would be one that enacts
a “conceivability” standard for this lurking, pre–step one question. As
long as the religious activity could conceivably be placed in either
category, the court must launch into the rest of the Calvary Chapel test.
“Arguably” implies a reasonableness component as to whether the
religious act could be placed in the favored category, but “conceivable”
would pose the question in terms of whether favored treatment is
within the realm of possibilities. Courts and judges would have a
harder time side-stepping the analysis without the comforting vagueness of a “reasonable” standard to hide behind. Although it is easy to
meet, the “conceivability” formulation does not pose a danger of
unduly increasing religious litigation and will not necessarily multiply
religious exceptions to an unmanageable degree. After all, courts can
filter out religious claims that are too disruptive of the public welfare
and that are rationally regulated in the second step when the
government explains its justification for the disfavored treatment.
What is important is to formulate the test so that judges are not invited
to pre-decide the case by reintroducing the comparability analysis that
caused so much unpredictability in the Tandon test. No test is perfect,
and the second step of Justice Kavanaugh’s test does require a
weighing and balancing that will inevitably differ according to each
judge’s sensibilities. However, his test would be at least incrementally
more protective of religious freedom than the Tandon test.
CONCLUSION
The pandemic cases were an exciting development in First
Amendment jurisprudence. Most especially, Justice Kavanaugh’s
exposition of the most favored nation theory for evaluating religious
exemptions broadened the horizon in terms of analyzing free exercise
accommodation claims. As laid out by Justice Kavanaugh, the most
favored nation theory provides a consistent, systemic way to evaluate
religious accommodation claims which places appropriate weight on
the importance of religious freedom. Because he limited the test to
laws that place religious organizations in a disfavored category rather
than suggesting a new standard for all free exercise claims, Justice
Kavanaugh could be especially protective of religious claimants’ rights
without opening the floodgates to constant religious accommodations.
Although the majority of the Court appeared to adopt a similar test in
Tandon, a close examination reveals that the majority’s formulation of
the test leads to inconsistent outcomes and, as interpreted by lower
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courts, resulted in a shocking record of defeats for religious litigants.
In inviting the judges to test the comparability of activities before
affording them strict scrutiny, the Tandon test places an additional
obstacle before religious claimants seeking protection. The vagueness
of the comparability test—whether two activities are similar in terms of
the governmental interest involved—leaves the door open for judicial
gerrymandering against religious claims. Lower court judges using this
test have arrived at decisions that were surely not intended by the
majority who adopted it.
Although both the Tandon test and Justice Kavanaugh’s test share
the same theoretical basis and move past the narrow system of
exemptions subject to strict scrutiny analysis under Smith, the practical
differences are quite extreme. As lower courts have demonstrated, the
most favored nation test favored by the Tandon majority can easily be
weaponized against religious litigants and consistently denies them
strict scrutiny. In contrast, Justice Kavanaugh’s test would yield
predictable results and would avoid the necessity of judges diving
deeply into the rationale and practical considerations behind the
policy. Most courts are not equipped to make determinations about
the practical effects of a particular policy and one reason Justice
Kavanaugh’s approach is so appealing is that it eliminates the need for
judges to do so. It consistently provides religious litigants with a more
favorable, strict scrutiny review, but also allows for denial of
exemptions when necessary. This would enable courts to strike the
right balance of protecting the central principle of religious liberty and
leaving detailed, technical judgments about policy to legislative bodies.
For all these reasons, Justice Kavanaugh’s most favored nation test
should become the governing test going forward for challenges to laws
that divide institutions or activities into favored and disfavored
categories. Of course, if Smith does finally get overturned in the future,
this test may fall by the wayside depending on what test or analysis
replaces Smith. In the meantime, however, Justice Kavanaugh’s test
would provide a haven for religious litigants in search of that pre-Smith
strict scrutiny analysis.
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